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Old 01-17-2012, 04:52 PM   #4
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Iran: A Diminishing Constraint

While Israel perceives Iran as a major threat, due to its ongoing nuclear program and aid to Hizballah and Hamas, India endeavors to maintain good relations with Iran, a major oil supplier. The Indo-Iranian Joint Commission, established in 1983, was instrumental in forging India‚??s close defense and military ties with Iran.[77] Also, after the end of the Cold War, India‚??s desire to counter the Pakistani influence, along with the burgeoning geopolitical importance of Central Asia and the need to strengthen economic and commercial ties, further bolstered ties between India and Iran.[78]

The defense cooperation that existed between India and Iran in the early part of the first decade of the twenty-first century was viewed as a constraint upon Indo-Israeli ties. India‚??s alleged discussions over arms sales to Iran during a meeting between Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain and his Iranian counterpart Ali Shamkani in 2001 raised eyebrows in Israel.[79] India-Iran defense cooperation was strengthened with the signing of a strategic partnership accord in January 2003, during then-Iranian President Mohammad Khatami‚??s visit to New Delhi.[80] This agreement promoted mutual defense ties, granting New Delhi access to Iranian bases in exchange for various Indian defense products, training, and technologies. Subsequently, hundreds of Indian naval and logistics specialists visited Iran, offering assistance on submarine maintenance and overhaul and tanks upgrades, and proposing the sale of Indian air defense equipment and airborne platforms.

Iran sought Indian technicians to refit and maintain its T-72 tanks as well as its BMP infantry fighting vehicles. In addition, India was reportedly planning to sell Iran Konkur anti-tank missiles. While these plans were clearly disconcerting for Israel, no such activities actually took place, and they seem unlikely in the near future.[81] In another potential deal in 2004, Iran negotiated the purchase of advanced Indian radar systems designed for fire control and surveillance of anti-aircraft batteries. The contract for the Upgraded Support Fledermaus radar system, to be supplied by the Indian state-owned firm BHEL, was estimated at around $70 million.[82] However, this deal remains suspended due to intense U.S. pressure, as the Americans fear these systems would enhance Iranian protection of its nuclear facilities.

One of Israel‚??s major concerns was the possible Indian transfer of Israeli-based technology or training to Iran. Israel, for obvious reasons, feared that its own technologies could be passed on to various terrorist organizations in the region, particularly Iranian-supported Hamas and Hizballah. These concerns were voiced by Israeli PM Ariel Sharon during his 2003 trip to India.

Israel also objects to Indo-Iranian joint military and naval maneuvers and reciprocal military visits. One such exercise took place in June 2006, when Iranian naval vessels visited the port of Kochi; another was held in March 2003, in the Arabian Sea. Naval cooperation dates back to the mid-1990s, when the Indian Navy assisted the Iranian Navy in adapting four Russian-built Kilo-class submarines for the Persian Gulf‚??s warm water.[83] Iran even joined the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), an agreement which allows Indian Ocean navies to collaborate with one another, with greater maritime cooperation planned for the future.[84] During the peak of their relationship, India also developed intelligence outposts in Iran along with a consulate in the port city of Bandar Abbas in 2001, to monitor ship movements in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.[85]

However, following the 2005 nuclear deal between New Delhi and Washington, Israeli concerns over the relationship between India and Iran began to dissipate. U.S. pressure on India to end all military relations with Iran appeared to have been a condition for the nuclear deal. Indeed, since this time, defense cooperation between India and Iran has been minimal or dormant. Except for five Iranian sailors who reportedly participated in a training course with the Indian Navy in 2007, there has been no visible military exchange between the two nations.[86] Moreover, though India and Iran established a joint working group on defense in 2003, no meetings have occurred for many years.

Furthermore, India‚??s rejection of an Iranian request for a satellite launch in November 2009 shattered Tehran‚??s hopes of cooperation in space technology. An Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official explained, ‚??India does not want to get entangled in Iran‚??s problems over its nuclear and missile programs; hence its reluctance to launch satellites that could assist its missile capability.‚?Ě[87] Iran‚??s proposal for a joint patrolling exercise in the Gulf was also rejected by India.[88]

Moreover, diplomatic relations between New Delhi and Tehran were downgraded substantially following India‚??s vote in September 2005, as well as in February 2006 and November 2009, against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its noncompliance to disclose intentions of its nuclear program. In November 2010, India abstained from voting on a UN resolution charging Iran with human rights violations‚??India had thus far always voted against the resolution, taking a pro-Tehran stance. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene‚??i responded by referring to Kashmir as a ‚??nation,‚?Ě a remark which further brewed mistrust between the two countries.[89]

In general, Iran has become a diminished constraint on all Indo-Israeli bilateral relationships, specifically in the area of defense cooperation. Furthermore, a revival of Indian-Iranian defense ties is very unlikely in the near future considering the risk the relationship poses to India‚??s blossoming ties with the United States and Israel.

Bureaucracy and Corruption Charges

Further difficulties that plague Indo-Israeli defense cooperation are bureaucracy and various corruption allegations involving major Israeli defense firms and Indian officials. First, the prevalence of a complex bureaucratic system in India remains a considerable hurdle to its arms procurement policies. Negotiations with Israel, the signing of bilateral agreements, and defense cooperation between the countries have often been hindered due to such bureaucratic sluggishness.

Furthermore, stringent regulations placed on foreign companies investing in Indian industry greatly limit domestic production due to the resulting delays in financial and technological transfer. In addition, the slow pace of weapons procurement by the government limits the arms production industry since it causes market stagnation. Due to the traditionally slow pace of the Indian Defense Ministry, observers doubt its arms purchase program will be capable of meeting the 2022 goal of acquiring $100 billion worth of equipment to replace India‚??s increasingly obsolete weaponry, a necessary move in the face of rising threats.

In order to meet its growing demands, India‚??s Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) announced in December 2010 the much-awaited new Defense Procurement Policy (DPP). Defense Minister A. K. Antony hoped that such a drastic step would help India achieve its goal of defense industry indigenization and also offer greater transparency.[90] The intention of this updated policy is to ensure an effective synergy between the public and private sectors in defense production programs. At the same time, it dictates that the government will continue relying on foreign arms suppliers should the indigenous industries have any difficulty supplying critical technologies or delivering products according to set timelines.[91] In addition to this new DPP, as India today still imports 70 percent of its defense items, defense planners are currently determining the feasibility of government-to-government foreign military sales (FMS)‚??a route that could be both quicker and cheaper.[92]

Indo-Israeli cooperation has also been occasionally undermined by allegations of bribery and corruption in certain arms deals. Such issues surfaced when India‚??s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) conducted an investigation of IAI and Rafael regarding the supply of Barak-1 missiles, a deal conducted by the BJP-led NDA government in 2000. India‚??s Defense Minister at the time, George Fernandes, and retired Naval Chief Admiral Sushil Kumar were involved in this alleged bribery scandal. It was discovered that the deal was signed by Fernandes despite objections from the government‚??s scientific advisor and former President of India A.P.J Abdul Kalam as well as from the DRDO. Several questions were also raised over the need for purchasing Israeli missile systems when India‚??s indigenously-built Trishul was nearly functional. In 2009, a similar bribery allegation surfaced regarding an agreement signed between India‚??s UPA government and IAI for the supply of MRSAM. The Indian government went ahead with this controversial deal while the investigation remains underway.

In the past, India usually blacklisted any defense firms involved in such scams. For example, due to corruption charges, India has in the past cancelled contracts for guns with the Swedish firm Bofors and the South African Denel, and submarine deals have been quashed with the German company Howaldstswerke. Consequently, the Indian military acquisition program was badly affected.[93] Similarly, the cancellation of a $250 million deal India‚??s Ministry of Defense (MOD) signed with IMI for the establishment of an ammunition factory in Nalanda also hindered ‚??India‚??s quest for self-reliance in the critical area of artillery ammunition.‚?Ě[94] However, despite many more corruption charges against Israel, Israeli duplicity has been treated somewhat differently than that of other countries, as breaking ties with Israeli firms would have much more serious repercussions on India‚??s military modernization and defense and security interests.

An important dimension of the aforementioned bribery allegations was the involvement of private entrepreneurs or middlemen in such arms transactions. Their influence in India derives from their ability to ease the decisionmaking process and from their connections with elite political leaders and bureaucrats. Apart from this, their willingness to pay heavy commissions to various politicians, military officials, and bureaucrats involved in the arms procurement process makes them ubiquitous in such dealings. This has not only raised question marks over the credibility and transparency of Israel as a reliable arms supplier but also tarnished the image of the Indian political and bureaucratic systems. In both alleged scams, middlemen played a role. Names such as Suresh Nanda (son of India‚??s retired Admiral S. M. Nanda), Sudhir Choudhary, and Vipin Khanna were the main focus of the investigative raids.[95] New Delhi has since attempted to regulate the role of the middlemen in defense deals, yet has achieved little success.

While the bribery issue is a little-discussed topic in Israel, in India it is recalled by various political parties to help promote their particular agendas. Generally such allegations garner criticism from left-leaning politicians who are not supportive of Indo-Israeli defense ties. Nonetheless, allegations of bribery in Israel-India arms deals and the related probes have had no visible effect on the arms trade so far. In fact, IAI and Rafael, while both under CBI investigation, continue to play pivotal roles in the Indian arms market.

CONCLUSION

Indo-Israeli defense cooperation is unlikely to decline in the near future. Israel‚??s credibility as a reliable arms supplier with limited political implications furthers these ties. In today‚??s complex international political arena, India desires the trust and confidence of a consistent partner who can deliver at any time. In addition, India‚??s quest for its own technological advancement in the defense industry provides incentive to expand ties with the Jewish state. The bilateral relationship between the two will continue to be driven by these close defense ties and shared national security challenges.

At a time when India‚??s neighbors, Pakistan and China, are enhancing their defense ties, India seeks greater engagement with Israel. The Jewish state has previously proven its credentials in times of crisis faced by India. For Israel too, further expansion of defense trades with this South Asian country is an economic and political imperative. Both countries should also aim to step up their cooperation on counterterrorism measures and on the joint development of defense systems.

Israel and India must enhance their political engagement as well, as defense ties alone cannot bind a bilateral relationship. Even though domestic political sensitivities in India still constitute a constraint on its policies toward Israel, there are considerable indications that New Delhi is trying to overcome these factors. This has been marked by the ongoing successful arms trade between the present Congress-led UPA government and Israel. Not only does this show the intensity of Indo-Israeli ties per se but the increasing flexibility of India in carving its own independent foreign policy objectives. It also represents the diminishing legacy of Cold War thinking and its limits upon an Indian-Israeli relationship.

Though arms sales have been the primary focus of the bilateral relationship, the expansion of activities in the commercial sector would be advantageous for both countries. Frequent cultural exchange could also improve the bilateral relationship. If Israel‚??s current attempt to open a consulate in the high-tech city of Bangalore is successful, cooperation in science and technology will be greatly enhanced too.

The entry of additional players in the Indian arms market should not be viewed as a hindrance either, as it is a matter of diversification of New Delhi‚??s priorities according to the defense needs and capabilities of any respective supplier. There are still a wide range of mutual benefits both countries gain especially with India‚??s gradual disengagement from its staunch traditional and ideological foreign policy approach in the Middle East. Finally, India‚??s interest in the Gulf is ever increasing. Preserving the current momentum should be the focus of all the actors involved in this complex game of international relations.

* Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
*Alvite Singh Ningthoujam is an Indian researcher who served as a Fellow at the BESA Center. This research was partly funded by the Israel Government Scholarship, 2010-2011.

NOTES
[1] Efraim Inbar, ‚??Israel‚??s Strategic Relations with Turkey and India,‚?Ě in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), Contemporary Israel: Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Security Challenges (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), p. 239.
[2] P. R. Kumaraswamy, India‚??s Israel Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 25-127.
[3] P. R. Kumaraswamy, ‚??Israel-India Relations: Seeking Balance and Realism,‚?Ě Israel Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1-2 (2004), p. 255.
[4]Arielle Kandel, ‚??The Significant Warning of Indo-Israeli Relations in the Post-Cold War Period,‚?Ě Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 13, No. 4) (December 2009), http://www.gloria-center.org/2009/12/kandel-2009-12-07/, p. 1.
[5] Efraim Inbar, ‚??The Indian-Israeli Entente,‚?Ě Orbis (Winter 2004), p. 90.
[6] Harsh V. Pant, ‚??India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints,‚?Ě MERIA, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2004), http://www.gloria-center.org/2004/12/pant-2004-12-06/, p. 2.
[7] Inbar, ‚??The Indian-Israeli Entente,‚?Ě p. 91.
[8] For a detailed and an earlier account of defense-related cooperation between India and Israel in the 1990s, see P. R. Kumaraswamy, ‚??India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership,‚?Ě Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 40 (September 1998).
[9] Raja Swamy, ‚??The Case against Collaboration Between India and Israel,‚?Ě MR Zine, August 2006, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2006/swamy300806.html.
[10] P. R. Kumaraswamy, ‚??Strategic Partnership Between India and Israel,‚?Ě MERIA, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1998), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue2/jv2n2a6.html, pp. 4-6.
[11] Inbar, ‚??The Indian-Israeli Entente,‚?Ě p. 95.
[12] Wendell Minnick, ‚??Israeli Exhibit Among Largest at Show,‚?Ě Defense News, February 12, 2009, http://www.defensenews.com/osd_story.php?i=3944502.
[13] Rahul Bedi, ‚??Moving Closer to Israel,‚?Ě Frontline, Vol. 20, No. 4 (February 2003), http://www.frontline.in/fl2004/stories/ ... 005500.htm. For example, Israel supplied the Indian Army with around 40,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunitions and 30,000 rounds of 160 mm mortars at the cost of $400 each during this war.
[14] Yiftah S. Shapir, ‚??Israel‚??s Arms Sales to India,‚?Ě Strategic Assessment, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2009), http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1259664485.pdf, p. 29.
[15] Inbar, ‚??Israel‚??s Strategic Relations with Turkey and India,‚?Ě p. 237.
[16] ‚??India, Israel Military Ties Continue to Grow,‚?Ě The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), April 8, 2003.
[17] Rajat Pandit, ‚??Israel Sneaks to No. 2 Spot as Arms Supplier,‚?Ě Times of India, February 9, 2007, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... green-pine.
[18] Shishir Gupta, ‚??Next Navy Chief Goes to Israel to Signal Smooth Bilateral Sailing,‚?Ě Indian Express, July 11, 2004, http://www.indianexpress.com/storyOld.php?storyId=50798.
[19] ‚??India Must Review Ties with Israel: Karat,‚?Ě The Times of India, March 14, 2007.
[20] ‚??Israeli Phalcon Reaching India on Monday,‚?Ě NDTV, May 24, 2009; ‚??India to Get Phalcon AWACS on Thursday,‚?Ě Times of India, March 24, 2010.
[21] Doug Tsuruoka, ‚??India‚??s Major Tech Needs Are Often Met by Israel,‚?Ě Investor‚??s Business Daily, January 26, 2007.
[22] ‚??Quietly, India-Israel Ties Growing,‚?Ě Times of India, March 9, 2007.
[23] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??Indian AF Buys Spyder Air-Defense Missiles,‚?Ě Defense News, September 2, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3702399.
[24] Shapir, ‚??Israel‚??s Arms Sales to India,‚?Ě p. 30.
[25] ‚??IDF Chief Set to Visit India to Strengthen Military Ties,‚?Ě Haaretz, December 6, 2009.
[26] Minnick, ‚??Israeli Exhibit Among Largest at Show.‚?Ě Israeli exhibits at Aero India 2009 included: Rafael‚??s mobile Iron Dome short-range artillery rocket; the Spike MR (range 2.5 kilometers) and Spike ER (8 kilometers), third generation man-portable (MANPAD) missile system also manufactured by Rafael; Elbit Systems‚?? various UAV platforms (Hermes 450, the new Hermes 900, and the Skylark I and II); IAI‚??s variety of products, including, namely, NIMROD 3, the Netcentric Laser-Guided Warfare System, the Naval Rotary UAV (NRUAV) system for naval vessels, and the Medium Range Ground-to-Air Missile (MRSAM) system; and the Israel Military Industries‚?? (IMI) offer to export Delilah‚??s stand-off air-to-surface missile systems, for ground and sea-based targets. Exhibits from smaller firms included: RADA Electronic Industries‚?? Inertial Navigation Systems, among them its R-100F FOG-based Embedded GPS/INS system and the Modular Avionics MEMS-based INS (MAVINS) system.
[27] Interview with Lova Drori, Executive VP-Marketing, Rafael, conducted by Defense News during Aero India 2009, November 20, 2009.
[28] Yaakov Katz, ‚??Israel Eyeing Big Defense Contracts in India,‚?Ě Jerusalem Post, March 10, 2010.
[29] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??India to Buy Israeli Spike Missiles,‚?Ě Defense News, March 21, 2011.
[30] ‚??Israel‚??s Iron Domes Intercepts First Gaza Rocket,‚?Ě Defense News, April 7, 2011. See also Uzi Rubin, ‚??The Missile Threat from Gaza: From Nuisance to Strategic Threat,‚?Ě Mideast Policy and Security Studies, No. 87 (October 2011).
[31] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??India Eyes Israeli Missile Systems,‚?Ě Defense News, July 12, 2010.
[32] ‚??IMI at Aero India 2011,‚?Ě Defenseworld.net, February 4, 2011.
[33] Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, & Carina Solmirano, ‚??Military Expenditure,‚?Ě SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 189.
[34] Siddharth Srivastava, ‚??India Sets Sights on Killer Drones,‚?Ě Asia Times Online, April 9, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD09Df01.html.
[35] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??India‚??s Defexpo 2010 to Attract 650 Companies,‚?Ě Defense News, February 12, 2010; Jyoti Malhotra, ‚??Largest Exhibitor Israel Is the Star at Defexpo,‚?Ě Business Standard, February 18, 2010, http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... po/386055/.
[36] Dror Marom, ‚??Israel and India to Develop Joint Attack Helicopter,‚?Ě Globes, September 26, 2002.
[37] A.K. Dhar, ‚??DRDO Seeks Israeli Expertise in Key Surveillance System,‚?Ě Outlook India, November 26, 2006.
[38] ‚??India, Israel to Craft Joint Anti-Aircraft Missile,‚?Ě Defense News, February 27, 2007; Ran Dagoni, ‚??Israel and India in New Missile Deal,‚?Ě Globes, July 10, 2007.
[39] Siddharth Srivastava, ‚??India Embraces US, Israeli Arms,‚?Ě Asia Times Online, July 27, 2007.
[40] ‚??India, Israel to Ramp Up Military Ties,‚?Ě Times of India, December 10, 2009.
[41] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??Tata Buys Majority Stake in HBL Elta Avionics,‚?Ě Defense News, November 26, 2010.
[42] ‚??Tata Group Acquires Stake in HBL Elta Avionics,‚?Ě Indian Military, November 25, 2010.
[43] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??A Call for India to Buy Indian More Often,‚?Ě Defense News, February 22, 2010. MINIPOP is an electro-optic system that provides image processing and automatic video tracker capabilities.
[44] Inbar, ‚??The Indian-Israeli Entente,‚?Ě p. 100.
[45] ‚??India Assisting Israeli Navy,‚?Ě Times of India, June 17, 2002.
[46] ‚??Israeli-Built Ship Commissioned in Indian Navy,‚?Ě Indian Express, October 9, 2003.
[47] ‚??India, Israel to Step Up Naval Ties,‚?Ě Times of India, August 8, 2007.
[48] ‚??India, Israel Mull Development of Unmanned Combat Helicopters,‚?Ě Times of India, August 14, 2007.
[49] ‚??India to Hold Wide-Ranging Strategic Talks with US, Israel,‚?Ě Times of India, January 19, 2010.
[50] ‚??Naval Chief Visits Haifa; Pays Homage to Fallen Indian Soldiers,‚?Ě Times of India, October 13, 2010.
[51] ‚??Indian Navy Marines Ready for Tavor Rifles,‚?Ě UPI Asia Online, January 20, 2011.
[52] Ilan Berman, ‚??Israel, India, and Turkey: Triple Entente?‚?Ě Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 33-40.
[53] ‚??India, Israel Army Brass Hold Talks,‚?Ě Times of India, June 14, 2007.
[54] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??Israeli Troops to Train Indian‚??s in Counterterrorism,‚?Ě Defense News, September 9, 2008.
[55] Ritu Sarin, ‚??From Israel, Lessons on fighting terror,‚?Ě Indian Express, July 21, 2009.
[56] Kevin Peraino, ‚??Why Israel Isn‚??t Angry,‚?Ě Newsweek, December 3, 2008.
[57] ‚??India, Israel Discuss Terrorism, Intelligence, Defence Trade,‚?Ě Outlook India, December 22, 2009.
[58] A Joint Working Group (JWG) was initially established in 2001, when then Director General of the Israeli Defense Ministry Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yaron made an unscheduled stopover in New Delhi and met then Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain.
[59] ‚??India, Israel Discuss Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism,‚?Ě Press Trust of India, January 5, 2010.
[60] Interview with Aby Har-Even, former head of the Israel Space Agency, February 7, 2011.
[61] Amnon Barzilai, ‚??Israel, India Sign Space Program Cooperation Agreement,‚?Ě Haaretz, November 11, 2002.
[62] R. Ramachandran, ‚??Tango with Israel,‚?Ě Frontline, March 2009. Specifically, ISRO Chief Kasturirangan signed an agreement during a 2003 visit to Israel for the launch of an Israeli astronomy satellite known as TAUVEX (Tel Aviv University Ultra Violet Experiment).
[63] P. R. Kumaraswamy, ‚??With Israel, Is Sky the Limit?‚?Ě New Indian Express (Chennai), January 39, 2008.
[64] Neeta Lal, ‚??India‚??s Eye in the Sky Takes Aim,‚?Ě Asia Times Online, April 21, 2009. This 300-kilogram satellite will orbit about 500 kilometers above Earth. It is designed by IAI and is equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology.
[65] M. Rama Rao, ‚??India‚??s Missile Deal with Israel in Controversy, Marxists Demand Probe, Congress Rejects,‚?Ě Asian Tribune, April 1, 2009.
[66] Ramachandran, ‚??Tango with Israel.‚?Ě
[67] Atul Aneja, ‚??US Objects to Sale of Arrow Missiles to India,‚?Ě The Hindu, September 8, 2003.
[68] Ramtanu Maitra, ‚??An Arrow to Washington‚??s Heart,‚?Ě Asia Times Online, August 20, 2002.
[69] Arie Egozi, ‚??Israel Bars AESA Radar Export to India,‚?Ě Flightglobal, January 11, 2011.
[70] ‚??U.S. Wants to Offer Best Defense Technology to India: Pentagon,‚?Ě Indian Express (New Delhi), September 24, 2010.
[71] Shaun Tandon, ‚??U.S. Puts End to India Export Restrictions,‚?Ě Defense News, January 25, 2011.
[72] ‚??Will Barack Obama Foster in a New Era of Indo-US military Cooperation,‚?Ě The Economic Times, November 22, 2010.
[73] Gurmeet Kanwal, ‚??Indo-US Defence Cooperation: Set to Chart a New Trajectory,‚?Ě IDSA Comment, November 23, 2010. The Entity List specifies the license requirements that the U.S. Department of Commerce imposes on each listed person or company. Those license requirements are independent of, and in addition to, license requirements imposed elsewhere by the Department of Commerce.
[74] Craig Hoyle, ‚??AERO India: MBDA, Rafael Go Head-to-Head for Air Force Weapon Deals,‚?Ě Flightglobal, February 9, 2011.
[75] Wendell Minnick, ‚??Russia Fights Increased Competition in India,‚?Ě Defense News, February 2009.
[76] Excerpted from an interview with Indian Secretary for Defense Production Raj Kumar Singh, Defense News, February 7, 2011, p. 22.
[77] Monika Chansoria, ‚??India-Iran Defense Cooperation,‚?Ě The Indian Defence Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January-March 2010), http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010 ... ation.html.
[78] Pant, ‚??India-Israel Partnership,‚?Ě p. 11.
[79] Christine C. Fair, ‚??India and Iran: New Delhi‚??s Balancing Act,‚?Ě Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer 2007), p. 150; Christine C. Fair, ‚??Indo-Iranian Ties: Thicker than Oil,‚?Ě MERIA, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007), http://www.gloria-center.org/2007/03/fair-2007-03-09/.
[80] Barbara Opall-Rome & Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??India‚??s Balancing Act: Avowed Foes Israel and Iran Key to New Delhi‚??s Security,‚?Ě Defense News, September 15, 2003.
[81] Fair, ‚??Indo-Iranian Ties‚?Ě
[82] ‚??Iran Seeks Indian Radar to Protect Nuke Facilities,‚?Ě Daily Times (Lahore), September 27, 2004.
[83] Vijay Sakhuja, ‚??Iran Stirs India-US Waters,‚?Ě IPCS Articles, April 10, 2006.
[84] Harsh V. Pant, ‚??India‚??s Relations with Iran: Much Ado About Nothing,‚?Ě Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 2011), http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Pant.pdf, pp. 64-65. Other nations involved in IONS include Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Madagascar, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, South Africa, Singapore, UAE, Yemen, etc.
[85] Fair, ‚??India and Iran,‚?Ě p. 151.
[86] J. Dutta, ‚??Israel or Iran? Antony Chooses Oman,‚?Ě The Telegraph (Kolkata), May 8, 2010.
[87] Sudha Ramachandran, ‚??The Elephant in India and Iran‚??s Room,‚?Ě Asia Times Online, November 21, 2009.
[88] A. Ranja, ‚??Delhi Reaches Out to Lonely Tehran, May Offer ISRO Launch for Satellite,‚?Ě Indian Express (New Delhi), November 16, 2009.
[89] A. Moha, ‚??Delhi Ticks Off Tehran over Kashmir ‚??Nation,‚??‚?Ě The Telegraph (Kolkata), November 20, 2010.
[90] Siddharth Srivastava, ‚??India‚??s Crippled Arms Purchase Spree,‚?Ě Asia Sentinel, March 25, 2010, http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?o ... Itemid=376.
[91] Ritu Sharma, ‚??New Production, Procurement Policy Cleared,‚?Ě Tehelka, December 15, 2010, htt p://www.tehelka.com/story_main48.asp ... EFENCE.asp.
[92] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‚??Bureaucracy Remains Hurdle to Rapid Arms Procurement,‚?Ě Defense News, March 1, 2010.
[93] Sudha Ramachandran, ‚??Indian Weapons Imports under the Gun,‚?Ě Asia Times Online, October 19, 2009.
[94] Radhakrishna Rao, ‚??Indian Defence Deals: Cleaning the Augean Sky,‚?Ě Army Articles, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, July 17, 2009, http://www.ipcs.org/article/army/indian ... -2910.html.
[95] Sudha Ramachandran, ‚??India Fails to Kick Out Arms Kickbacks,‚?Ě Asia Times Online, November 4, 2006.
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