[gDGwm8BC]

The Afghan Taliban increasingly view al-Qaida “as a handicap,” according to the senior U.S. military intelligence officer in Afghanistan.

In a Dec. 22 slide briefing titled “State of the Insurgency — Trends, Intentions and Objectives,” Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, director of intelligence for the International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, said the Taliban’s aim is to “manage” their relationship with al-Qaida “to avoid alienating [the] Afghan population,” while encouraging support from the “global jihad network.”

Although this alliance poses a public relations challenge for the Taliban, al-Qaida provides the Afghan insurgency with “facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan,” Flynn said.

Meanwhile, the more the Afghan insurgents are perceived to be succeeding, the more foreign fighters will be drawn to Afghanistan to fight alongside them, he said.

The relationship with al-Qaida is just one of several that the Taliban must handle deftly to avoid alienating any core constituencies or allies, according to the briefing, which is unclassified and has circulated widely via e-mail among national security professionals in Washington.

For instance, the Taliban are careful not to antagonize the Pakistani and Iranian governments “in order to mitigate against [any] crackdown on safe havens or support systems” in those countries, Flynn said.

For that reason, the Taliban “manage [their] relationship with Pakistani militant groups to encourage reduced attacks in Pakistan, but encourage support for efforts in Afghanistan.”

The “current [Afghan Taliban] vision if they return to power is to re-establish good relations with Islamic and regional states,” Flynn said.

The briefing’s overall message is a bleak one for ISAF and the Afghan government: the insurgency is quickly gaining strength, “has the momentum” and “can sustain itself indefinitely.”

As the “loosely organized” insurgency grows more cohesive, its strength is enabled in part by the Afghan government’s weakness, Flynn said, echoing a frequent complaint of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

“Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency,” he said, adding that in counterinsurgency, “catch-up ball does not work.”

Although the briefing is full of slides depicting the insurgents’ organizational structure and quantifying the rise in violence, Flynn said their “overarching strategy and plans remain unclear.”

However, he said, their “overarching goals” are to expel foreign forces from Afghanistan, undermine the Afghan government’s authority and the population’s perceptions of security, and ultimately establish a Sunni state under Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar.

Insurgents detained by the coalition said they perceived 2009 as their “most successful year of the war,” and viewed the August presidential and provincial council elections as a success because of low voter turnout and widespread allegations of fraud directed at President Hamid Karzai, according to the briefing.

Flynn laid out two possible insurgent courses of action if international support for the coalition effort wanes. In what he dubbed the “most likely” course, the insurgent goal would be to maintain pressure on ISAF by steadily increasing the level of violence, while still enabling the foreign troops to withdraw.

The “most dangerous” insurgent course would be to seek to destroy ISAF by inflicting casualties on withdrawing forces, significantly increasing “high-profile attacks in urban areas” while imposing Sharia law and punishing, rather than accommodating, Afghans who had supported the coalition.

Flynn said the Taliban is conducting a “population-centric” insurgency designed to win over the Afghan people. His briefing highlights the “Taliban Code of Conduct” published in mid-July 2009 by the Taliban leadership, calling it “Mullah Omar’s COIN guidance” — an apparent reference to ISAF commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s own counterinsurgency guidance issued in August.

McChrystal’s guidance says, “Protecting the people is the mission.” Mullah Omar’s “Taliban Code of Conduct” says, “This is our mission: to keep people and their property safe,” according to Flynn’s briefing.

Despite the gravity of the situation, Flynn said, the coalition retains at least one “key advantage,” which is that the Taliban “is not a popular movement [yet].”

However, he said, the Afghan people are frustrated by their government’s apparent inability to deal with the insurgency. “We must make them believe ISAF [and the Afghan government] can succeed,” Flynn said.

Although “the Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum,” with “shadow governors” in all but one of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, “additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces,” Flynn said.

“Under-resourcing” coalition efforts “significantly elevates risk, increases lag time, and is likely to cause failure,” he said.

He did not quantify what would constitute “under-resourcing.”


Article: http://www.militarytimes.com/news/20...gency_012510w/